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The FTC's Injunctive Authority Against False Advertising of 
Food and Drugs 
Section 12 of the Federal Trade Commission Act1 declares the 
false advertisement2 of food, drugs, cosmetics or devices to be an 
unfair or deceptive act and, as such, a violation of law that the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is mandated to prevent.3 Al-
though the FTC's principal means of enforcing section 12 is the 
administrative procedure leading to a cease and desist order,4 it also 
possesses supplementary authority under section 13 (a) of the Act 
to seek an injunction against an advertisement pending initiation and 
completion of the cease and desist procedure. 5 
Two judicial decisions in the early 1950s construing the FTC's 
section 13 (a) power6 produced a conflict that has not been resolved 
either by later courts 7 or by the amendments to section 13 enacted 
in 1973.8 The dispute basically concerns the depth of the courts' 
inquiry into whether an advertisement violates- section 12 and the,l 
applicability of traditional equitable concepts in the context of the 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975). 
2. Section 15 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. ,§ 55(a)(l) (1970), defines false advertise-
ment, for the purpose of section 12, to be "an advertisement, other than labeling, 
which is misleading in a material respect." 
3. The basic mandate of the Federal Trade Commission is "to prevent persons, 
partnerships, or corporations . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or 
affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting com-
merce." Federal Trade Commission Act§ 5(a)6, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(6) (1970). 
4. See text at notes 9-12 infra. 
5. The FrC is authorized to petition in a federal district court for an injunction 
whenever it has "reason to believe" 
1) that any person, partnership, or corporation is engaged in, or is about to 
engage in, the dissemination or the causing of the dissemination of any adver-
tisement [in violation of § 12] and ' 
2) that the enjoining thereof pending the issuance of a complaint by the Com-
mission . . . and until such complaint is dismissed by the Commission or set 
aside by the court on review, or the order of the Commission to cease and 
desist made thereon has become final . . . , would be to the interest of the 
public .... 
The statute then directs that "upon proper showing a temporary injunction or re-
straining order shall be granted without bond." Federal Trade Commission Act 
§ 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). 
6. FrC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), noted in 65 
HARv. L. REV. 349 (1951); FrC v. National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. 
Md. 1952). . . 
1. Compare FrC v. National Commn. on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 
1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 919 (1976), with FrC v. Simeon Management Corp., 
532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976). 
8. The amendment to section 13 was adopted as section 408(f) of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
See Halverson, The Federal Trade Commission's Injunctive Powers Under the Alaska 
Pipeline Amendments: An Analysis, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 872 (1975). 
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statutory injunction procedure. This Note contends that the legis-
lative history of pertinent provisions of the Act suggests an appropriate 
resolution of the conflict through a two-step approach that would 
relax the scrutiny ordinarily accorded petitions for preliminary relief 
but would not dispense with the same general considerations that have 
traditionally been used in equitable matters. 
Issuance of an injunction alters the normal course of the cease 
and desist procedure,9 which is initiated when the Commission issues 
a complaint. To support a complaint, the FTC must have "reason 
to believe" that a violation of the Act has occurred, and it must 
"appear to the Commission" that a proceeding to terminate the viola-
tion is in the public interest.10 If the respondent chooses to contest 
the matter, a hearing is held before an administrative law judge, 
with the staff of the Commission prosecuting the case.11 The adminis-
trative law judge may dismiss the complaint or issue a cease and 
desist order, but either result may theri be appealed to the full Com-
mission, which acts as an appellate tribunal. An unsuccessful re-
0 spondent has the right to challenge the Commission's decision in the 
federal courts of appeal.12 
An injunction is useful in certain cases because the cease and 
desist order has no effect until the entire appellate process is com-
pleted. If the order is not appealed to the courts, the penalties pro-
vided for violation of a "final" order become effective only at the 
expiration of the time permitted for filing an appeal. 13 If the order 
9. For a succinct description of the FTC's other regulatory powers, see Posner, 
Regulation of Advertising by the FTC, 11 EVALUATIVE STUDIES 12-14 (1973). 
10. § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 45{b) (Supp. V 1975). The requirement that the Com-
mission issue a complaint only where "it shall appear to the Commission that a 
proceeding . . . would be in the interest of the public was early construed as a limita-
tion of the Commission's jurisdiction to those cases where the public interest is "spe-
cific and substantial." FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19, 28 (1929). It was held in 
the same case that the "Commission exercises a broad discretion" as to whether 
a proceeding would be in the public interest, but that its determination on the matter 
is subject to judicial review. 280 U.S. at 28, 30. Courts today, however, generally 
require only that the matter not be trivial. See Millstein, The Federal Trade Com-
mission and False Advertising, 64 CoLUM. L. REV. 439, 483-87 (1964 ). 
11. The mechanics of the hearing procedure may be found in 16 C.F.R. §§ 3.41-
3.46 (1976). In general, a hearing is in the form of a trial, and the parties "have 
the right of due notice, cross examination, presentation of evidence, objection, mo-
tion, argument, and all other rights essential to a fair hearing." 16 C.F.R. § 3.41 
(c) (1976). 
12. Review of the decision of the courts of appeal is available to both parties 
by a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Provisions concerning judicial review 
of Commission orders are set out in Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(c), 15 
U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). 
13. Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, § 5(g), 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) 
(1970), a cease and desist order becomes final 
(1) upon expiration of the time allowed for filing a petition for review, if such 
petition has been duly filed within such time; . . • or (2) upon the expiration 
of the time allowed for filing a petition for certiorari; . . . or (3) upon the 
denial of a petition for certioran; • • • or ( 4) upon the expiration of thirty 
days from the date of issuance of the mandate of the Supreme Court, if such 
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is challenged, the penalties take effect only after all avenues of 
judicial review are exhausted. There may thus be a period of months 
or, not uncommonly, years between the issuance of a complaint and 
the respondent's incurring of liability for a violation.14 The injunc-
tive authority of section 13(a) was intended to enable the Commis-
sion to provide more immediate protection for the consuming public.15 
The terms of the statute identify two general issues as relevant to 
the propriety of an injunction. The Commission is authorized to 
petition in a federal district court for an injunction whenever it has 
"reason to believe" that a violation of section 12 has occurred or is 
imminent, and that an injunction pending initiation and completion 
of the cease and desist procedure is in the public interest.16 "Upon 
proper showing'' by the Commission, the court is instructed to grant 
the injunction.17 
It is the content -of the "proper showing" requirement that has 
produced judicial conflict.18 The first case construing the phrase, 
Court directs that the order of the Commission be affirmed . . . . 
A respondent who violates a final cease and desist order becomes·liable for the 
civil penalties provided in section 5([), 15 U.S.C. § 45([) (Supp. V 1975). 
14. Illustrative of the potential for delay is FTC v. Rhodes Pharmacal Co., 191 
F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951), in which a complaint was issued in August, 1949, yet 
a cease and desist order was not entered until October, 1952. That order was subse-
quently challenged in the Seventh Circuit and thus became "final" only after affirm-
ance by that court in November, 1953. See Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 
382 (7th Cir. 1953), modified, 348 U.S. 940 (1955). 
15. The injunctive authority of section 13(a) was added to the Commission's 
powers by the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 52 
Stat. 111 (1938). See text at note 126 infra. 
16. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). See 
note 5 supra. A literal reading of the requirement of section 13(a)(2), that an 
injunction "pending the issuance of a complaint by the Commission" be in the public 
interest, would suggest that the Commission's authority to seek an injunction exists 
only prior to the issuance of a complaint. See, f!.g., Legislation-The Federal Trade 
Commission Act of 1938, 39 CoLUM. L. REV. 259, 268 (1939). It is now estab-
lished, however, that that authority persists throughout the administrative phase of 
the· cease and desist procedure. See FTC v. National Health Aids, 108 F. Supp. 
340, 343-44 (D. Md. 1952). 
17. Federal Trade Commission Act, § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). See 
note 5 supra. 
18. There have been only four cases in which the content of a "proper showing" 
has been defined. That rather sparse judicial history is explained by the Commis~ 
sion's sporadic use of the remedy. By far the majority of actions under the statute 
were brought within the first three years after the adoption of section 13(a). Those 
early cases resulted in the Commission obtaining injunctions in 37 of its first 38 
attempts. However, no consensus emerged from those cases as to the showing the 
Commission was required to make to obtain an injunction. The Commission's suc-
cess suggests that the courts relaxed the generally strict standards of equity, yet the 
decrees commonly included such traditional findings as that "immediate and irrepara-
ble injury" would result in the absence of relief. See, e.g., FTC v. Chapman Health 
Prods., 30 F.T.C. 1687, 1688 (N.D. Ohio 1939). In the one early case in which 
the Commission failed to obtain an injunction, the court clearly did not relax equita-
ble standards, basing its ruling on the presence of defense affidavits "denying the 
equities of the bill." FTC v. American Medicinal Prods., 30 F.T.C. 1683, 1684 
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FTC v. Rhodes Pharmaca/, Co., 19 involved advertisement of the aspirin 
product "Imdrin" as a rheumatism and arthritis treatment. The 
district court, without specific reference to the terms of section 13 (a), 
appeared to conclude that issuance of an injunction under the statute 
was governed by the same standards that controlled a private litigant's 
ability -to obtain preliminary relief. 2° Faced as it was with com-
peting affidavits from the parties, the court held that, when a plain-
tiff's contentions "are seriously disputed, an injunction will not 
issue."21 On appeal, the Seventh Circuit explicitly rejected the dis-
trict court's reliance on the standards of private litigation and held, 
instead, that "the standards of the public interest" were the appro-
priate measure for a statutory injunction, 22 and, further, that those 
(S.D. Cal. 1940). But cf. Koch Laboratories v. FTC, 34 F.T.C. 1867 (E.D. Mich. 
1942), appeal dismissed and opinion set out, 38 F.T.C. 931 (6th Cir. 1944) (injunc-
tion entered despite existence of "honest controversy" where harm threatened to pub-
lic by continuation of advertisements outweighed harm threatened to defendants by 
an injunction). 
19. 1950-51 Trade Cas. 67,782 (N.D. Ill.), revd., 191 F.2d 744 (7th Cir. 1951). 
20. While the general principle of equity is that the grant of a preliminary in-
junction is left to the discretion of the court, three basic tests are typically applied 
to indicate the propriety of such relief. The court must consider, first, whether the 
petitioner has demonstrated a probable ultimate right to the relief requested, second, 
whether the petitioner has shown a probable danger that that right will be defeated 
unless an injunction is issued, and, third, whether the damage to the petitioner in 
the absence of an injunction clearly outweighs any harm which may be caused by 
issuance of an injunction. See J. MOORE & H. FINK, 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 
,r 65.04(1), at 65-39 to 65-45 (2d ed. 1975). Courts, however, are much less in-
clined to issue a preliminary injunction where, as in Rhodes, the sole support for 
the petitioner's claim is the testimony of affidavits. See, e.g., Sims v. Greene, 161 
F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1947). Where affidavits are contradicted by counter-affidavits, 
courts will generally not attempt to resolve factual disputes and "the proper exercise 
of discretion will normally call for a denial" of injunctive relief. See J. MOORE 
& H. FINK, supra, ,r 65.04(3), at 65-63; cf. Ross-Whitney Corp. v. Smith Kline & 
French Laboratories, 207 F.2d 190, 198 (9th Cir. 1953) ("[A] preliminary injunc-
tion may be granted upon affidavits. A requirement of oral testimony would in 
effect require a full hearing on the merits and would thus defeat one of the purposes 
of a preliminary injunction which is to give speedy relief from irreparable injury"). 
21. 1950-51 Trade Cas. at 64,314. The analysis of the district court was applied 
in an earlier action involving section 13(a). See FTC v. American Medicinal Prods., 
30 F.T.C. 1683 (S.D. Cal. 1940). 
22. 191 F.2d 744, 747 (7th Cir. 1951) (citing Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 
321, 331 (1943) ). The court's reliance on Hecht is somewhat peculiar, since, taken 
broadly, Hecht argues for the extension of equitable principles to injunctions au-
thorized by statute. The statute involved in Hecht was section 205(a) of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act, and was considerably more peremptory in its language than 
section 13(a). See 321 U.S. at 326, 327. The issue in the case was a federal court's 
power to deny ai:i injunction where the sole requirement of the statute, proof of 
a violation of the Price Control Act, had been established. An jnjunction had been 
denied in an action brought before a district court because of evidence that the 
violation had been inadvertent and had been thereafter discontinued. That judgment 
was reversed by the District of Columbia Circuit, which· held that the mandatory 
language of section 205(a) required issuance of an injunction once proof of a viola-
tion was shown. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the appeals court and re-
manded the case to that court to determine whether the district court had abused 
its discretion in dismissing the complaint. See 321 U.S. at 331. The Court con-
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standards were set by the specific terms of the statute. 28 The court 
found no statutory language or legislative history that defined the re-
quired "proper showing,"24 but nevertheless ruled that the only issue 
that should have been before the district court was whether the 
Commission had shown "reason to believe" that the advertisements 
were false or misleading.25 Accordingly, the court remanded the case 
for a determination on that issue. 
The Seventh Circuit's interpretation of section 13 (a) discounts 
as an independent issue the statute's "public interest" requirement. 26 
The opinion suggests two alternative grounds for that result. The 
first derives from the court's statement that protection of the public 
from misleading advertisements is in the public interest,27 which 
implies that evidence of an advertisement's misleading nature is itself 
evidence that an injunction against the advertisement is in the public 
interest. The second can be gleaned from the court's assertion that 
the Commission possesses a "broad discretion" as to whether a "pro-
ceeding" is in the public interest, 28 which implies that presumptive 
validity will be given the Commission's judgment that an injunction 
serves the public interest. In effect, the court's interpretation of 
section 13 ( a) treats the public interest requirement of the statute 
as a perfunctory rather than substantive aspect of the Commission's 
obligation to make a "proper showing," and correspondingly limits the 
court's inquiry into the appropriateness of an injunction to the ques-
tion of an advertisement's falsity. 
The conclusions of Rhodes were brought into question in FTC v. 
National Hea/,th Aids, lnc.,29 in which the FI'C sought an injunction 
to suppress allegedly misleading advertisements for the vitamin supple-
ment "NHA-Complex." Rejecting the Commission's assertion of a 
"reason to believe" standard, the district court concluded that "it was 
hardly the intention of Congress to require a district court in the 
exercise of the extraordinary remedy of injunction to proceed affir-
eluded that section 205(a), despite its mandatory language, afforded "a full oppor-
tunity for equity courts to treat enforcement proceedings under this emergency legis-
lation in accordance with their traditional practices, as conditioned by the necessities 
of the public interest . . .. " 321 U.S. at 330. See Note, The Statutory Injunction 
as a11 Enforcement Weapon of Federal Agencies, 51 YALE L.J. 1023, 1027-28 (1948). 
23. 191 F.2d at 747. 
24. 191 F.2d at 747. 
25. The court stated: 
The District Court was not required to find the charges made to be true, 
but to find reasonable cause to believe them to be true . . . . This is to say, 
in the instant case, the court had only to resolve the narrow issue of whether 
there was "reasonable cause" to believe that the alleged violation had taken 
place. 
191 F.2d at 748. 
26. See text at note 16 supra. 
27. 191 F.2d at 747. 
28. 191 F.2d at 747. 
29. 108 F. Supp. 340 (D. Md. 1952). 
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matively merely on the basis of the reasonable belief of the adminis-
trative agency."30 Instead, citing the substantial private interests that 
an injunction could affect, the court declared that its decision should 
be based on general equitable considerations.31 Its eventual action 
reflects a two-part test, in which it independently evaluated the 
advertisements' accuracy and determineq the potential injury to the 
public in the event of their continuance. Applying an evidently 
stricter standard on the falsity issue than was mandated in Rhodes, 
the court found section 12 violations to be "clearly established." 
Then, finding evidence of possible physical and pecuniary harm 
should the advertisements continue, the court concluded that an in-
junction was indeed warranted. 32 
The first case to consider the uncertainty left by the decisions in 
Rhodes and National Health Aids was FTC v. Sterling Drug, lnc.,33 
in which the Commission sought to restrain the makers of Bayer 
Aspirin from allegedly misrepresenting the findings of a government-
sponsored study of pain relievers. 34 In an ambiguous opinion that 
appeared to endorse both the Rhodes position and a stricter require-
ment that there be "reasonable certainty" of ultimate Commission 
success on the merits, the district court denied an injunction. 35 
The latter requirement was the basis for the FTC's appeal in 
which it contended that the "reason to believe" standard of Rhodes 
was the appropriate test. The Second Circuit, however, affirmed 
the decision because it was not convinced that the district court had 
in fact applied the higher standard, and also because it concluded 
30. 108 F. Supp. at 346. 
31. The court stated that "the action of the Court should be based on the general 
considerations that properly apply in the issuance of preliminary injunctions." 108 
F. Supp. at 346. 
32. 108 F. Supp. at 348. 
33. 215 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 317 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1963). 
34. The basic conclusion of the study was that there were no significant differ-
ences in the effectiveness of the five products tested (Bayer, St. Joseph's Aspirin, 
Bufferin, -Excedrin and Anacin). The manufacturers of Bayer, which was priced 
lower than its competitors, were understandably pleased by those findings and did 
not hesitate to present them in their advertisements. Though the study had been 
authorized and financed by the Commission itself, one of the Commission's com-
plaints was that the advertisements referred to a government sponsored medical team. 
See 215 F. Supp. at 330-32. 
35. In evaluating the Commission's request for an injunction under section 13(a), 
the district court, while making no reference to the conflict between Rhodes and 
National Health Aids, appeared at least partially to endorse Rhodes, for it cited that 
case in concluding: "Of course, in evaluating the falsity of the -advertisement, the 
Court in this proceeding has only to resolve whether there was reasonable cause 
to believe that the alleged violation had taken place." 215 F. Supp. at 332. Howev~r, 
in ultimately concluding that the Commission had failed to establish such "reasonable 
cause to believe," the court rather confusingly noted that the law was "well estab-
lished" that a preliminary injunction would not issue unless the court was "convinced 
with reasonable certainty that the complainant would succeed at the final hearing." 
215 F. Supp. at 332. 
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independently that the Commission had not even managed to establish 
"reason to believe" that the advertisements were false. 36 Conse-
quently, the court did not have to consider the validity of the Rhodes 
standard. It did, however, suggest that courts retained some latitude 
even under Rhodes, stating that "[n]ot even the Commission con-
tends that in· a proceeding under section 13 (a) the judge is merely 
a rubber stamp, stripped of the power to exercise independent judg-
ment on the issue of the Commission's 'reason to believe.' "37 
Sterling Drug was the last appellate consideration of section 13 (a) 
before the amendments to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 
1973. 38 The major impact of the amendments, which did not affect 
section 13 (a) itself, was to add section 13 (b) 39 authorizing in-
junctive relief for violation of any law enforced by the Commis-: 
sion. 40 Section 13 (b) empowered the Commission to seek pre-
liminary injunctions under the same "reason to believe" standard 
set out in section 13 (a), 41 but instead of directing that an injunc-
tion "shall be issued" upon "proper showing,"42 the new provision 
stated that an injunction "may be granted" upon a "proper showing 
that, weighing the equities and considering the Commission's like-
lihood of ultimate success, such action would be in the public in-
terest."43 
36. 317 F.2d at 678. 
37. 317 F.2d at 677. While the Second Circuit stated that the Commission was 
obliged to demonstrate its "reason to believe" both that the advertisement was false 
and that an injunction would be in the public interest, 317 F.2d at 677, it did not, 
because of its findings concerning the advertisement's falsity, suggest the sort of evi-
dence that would have been required to establish that an injunction would have been 
in th~ public interest. The Commission had supported its petition with allegations 
that consumers were misled by the Bayer advertisements, to their "irreparable injury," 
and further, that Bayer's competitors would respond in kind if the advertisements 
were continued. 317 F.2d at 676. Since the study had indeed concluded that there 
were no significant differences among the various pain relievers, it is not clear why 
either of those consequences was thought to be sufficiently threatening to require 
that the Bayer advertisements be immediately suppressed. 
38. See note 8 supra. 
39. The pre-existing section 13(b) authorized the court to exempt from the scope 
of an injunction a particular issue of a publication if the injunction "would delay 
the delivery of such issue after the regular time therefor. . •. " That provision was 
retained but moved to section 13(c) by the 1973 Amendment. 
40. Application of section 13(a) is limited to violations of section 12, see note 5 
supra, and thus the addition of section 13 (b) represented a significant expansion 
of the Commission's authority. See Halverson, supra note 8. Prior to the adoption 
of section 13 (b), however, the Commission possessed the infrequently used authority 
to seek injunctions against violations of the labelling acts. See Wool Products La-
belling Act § 7(b), 15 U.S.C. § 68(e) (1970); Fur Products Labelling Act § 9(b), 
15 U.S.C. § 69(g) (1970); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act § 8, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 70(f) (1970). 
41. § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
42. § 13(a), 15 U.S.C. § 53(a) (1970). 
43. § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
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The adoption of section 13 (b) has had a substantial impact upon 
subsequent interpretations of section 13(a), primarily because of the 
Conference Committee Report's44 interpretation of prior case law. 
Specifically, the Report stated that the more explicit definition in 
section 13 (b) of a "proper showing" was not intended "to impose a 
totally new standard of proof different from that which is now re-
quired of the Commission,"45 but rather was intended 
to define the duty of the courts to exercise independent judgment on 
the propriety of issuance of a temporary restraining order or a pre-
liminary injunction. This new language is intended to codify the 
decisional law of Federal Trade Commission v. National Health 
Aids, 108 F. Supp. 340, and Federal Trade Commission v. Sterling 
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d1 669, and similar cases which have defined the 
judicial role to include the exerci~e of such independent judgment.40 
The first case to consider section 13 (a) in light of the 1973 
amendments arose in the Seventh Circuit, which was also the origin 
of the Rhodes decision. In FTC v. National Commission on Egg 
Nutrition,47 the FTC sought to suppress advertisements that denied 
the existence of any credible scientific evidence linking egg consump-
tion with the incidence of heart disease. It asserted the continuing 
validity of the Rhodes doctrine, 48 but that contention was rejected by 
the district court, which stated that Rhodes had been disapproved in 
National Health Aids and that Congress, in light of the Conference 
Report to the 1973 amendments, viewed the latter case as the pre-
vailing law. 49 Significantly, since the Conference Report had identi-
fied the language of section 13 (b) as an intended codification of 
National Health Aids' interpretation of section 13(a), the court con-
cluded that 
[n]otwithstanding the differences in statutory language between 
section 13(a) and section 13(b), I am of the opinion that the phrase 
"proper showing" has the same meaning when used both in section 
13(a) and section 13(b), ... and that within that meaning is 
encompassed the Commission's burden of at least showing the 
necessary public interest, a favorable balance of the equities, and 
the probable chance of success. 50 
In applying the approach outlined in that conclusion, the court, after 
finding that the Commission had shown "reason to believe" that the 
advertisements were misleading, 51 focused its attention on the public 
44. CONF. REP. No. 93-924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1973] U.S. CODE 
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2523, 2533 [hereinafter cited as CoNF. REP.]. 
45. Id. at 2533. 
46. Id. 
47. 1975-1 Trade Cas. 1[ 60,246 (N.D. Ill. 1974), revd., 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 
1975). 
48. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966-67. 
49. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966. 
50. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,966. 
51. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,969. 
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interest question. It concluded, after an analysis of the egg market, 
that continuation of the advertisements during cease and desist pro-
ceedings would have no effect on the total quantity of eggs con-
sumed. 52 Moreover, the court held that an injunction might have the 
harmful effects of restricting useful public debate on the cholesterol 
issue and damaging the financial interests of the respondents.53 After 
balancing these factors against the likelihood that more consumers 
would be misled if the advertisements were continued, the court held 
that the Commission had failed to meet its burden as to the public 
interest, and denied an injunction. 54 
Upon appeal, the Seventh Circuit totally rejected the district court's 
analysis. 55 With regard to the 1973 amendments, the court held that 
Congress' addition of section 13 (b), 
[b]y providing the traditional equity standards ... and the permissive 
"may" in (b), while leaving (a) without those standards and with 
its peremptory "shall," indicated an intention that those standards 
be applied in proceedings under (b) but not in those under (a), and 
no intention that the judicial interpretations of (a) should be af-
fected by the amendment. 56 
Accordingly, the court held that its earlier opinion in Rhodes remained 
the authoritative interpretation of section 13 (a), and that the district 
court erred in going beyond the question of whether there was "reason 
to believe" that the advertisements were false. 57 Because the district 
court had expressly found that the FTC had met that burden, 58 the 
Seventh Circuit ordered that an injunction be granted. 59 
52. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970. 
53. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970. 
54. 1975-1 Trade Cas. at 65,970. The court made additional, though unelabo-
rated, findings that the Commission had failed to establish the probability of its 
ultimate success and a favorable balance of equities. In light of the express balanc-
ing of interests the court conducted in determining that an injunction would not 
be in the public interest, it is unclear what the second of those findings adds to 
the court's holding other than to repeat the statutory language of section 13(b). 
55. 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975). 
56. 517 F.2d at 488-89. Presumably referring to the statements in the Confer-
ence Report, the court asserted that its inference as to Congress' intentions was not 
refuted by the amendment's "somewhat ambiguous legislative history." 517 F.2d at 
489. 
57. 517 F.2d at 489. 
58. In an oblique reference to the "public interest" issue, the court stated: ''The 
Commission also showed that it believed an injunction would be in the best interest 
of the public, a statement which the District Court credited to the extent that more 
people were likely to be misled if the pronouncements were permitted to continue." 
517 F.2d at 489. The court thus appeared to adopt the analysis of its earlier decision 
in Rhodes, suggesting that to the extent the "public interest" requirement of section 
13(a) was not discretionary with the Commission, it was satisfied by a showing 
that the advertisements were misleading. See text at note 26 supra. 
59. 517 F.2d at 490. Chief Judge Fairchild argued in a concurring opinion that 
advertising, at least where it expressed an opinion on a "genuine controversy," was 
protected by the first amendment, and that, accordingly, "reason to believe" an adver-
tisement was false was an insufficient basis for an injunction. He was able to concur 
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The hope that the conflict over section 13 (a) had been resolved 
by National Commission on Egg Nutrition was quic~ly frustrated by 
FTC v. Simeon Management Corp. 60 In that case, the Commission 
sought to enjoin advertisements for a weight reduction program that 
employed a drug unapproved by the Food and Drug Administration. 01 
The district court's confusing opinion evidenced a failure to recognize 
the textual differences between sections 13 (a) and 13 (b), 02 and, 
applying the standards of subsection (b), the court denied the in-
junction. 63 
On appeal by the Commission, the Ninth Circuit held that the 
showings required under sections 13(a) and 13(b) were "essentially 
the same,"64 and that the district court had therefore not erred in 
applying section 13 (b) standards to the Commission's injunction 
request. 65 The court suggested that, in light of the Conference 
in the issuance of the injunction in this case, however, because he thought the adver-
tisements had been shown to be clearly misleading. 517 F.2d at 490-91. For a 
discussion of this issue, see note 65 infra. 
60. 391 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1975), affd., 532 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1976). 
61. The Commission's request for an injunction was brought under both section 
13(a) and section 13(b), apparently out of a concern that advertisements for a 
weight reducing program employing a. drug, as opposed to advertisements for the 
drug itself, would not fall within the scope of section 12. Because the district court 
held that the advertisements were within section 12, 391 F. Supp. at 703-04, the 
standards of section 13(a) became relevant to the propriety of an injunction. 
62. Judge Orrick appeared to assume that the more explicit definition of a "propel' 
showing" found in section 13(b) was also present in section 13(a). With reference 
to the conflicting interpretations of section 13(a), Judge Orrick stated: 
Considering that the statute specifically directs the Court to weigh the equities 
and considering the extraordinary and important nature of injunctive relief, I 
am of the view that the District Court must do more than determine if the 
administrative agency had reasonable cause to believe that the alleged violation 
had taken place. 
391 F. Supp. at 700. 
63. In ruling that the Commission had failed to make the "proper showing" re-
quired for an injunction, Judge Orrick first found that "the FTC [did] not have 
a strong likelihood of establishing at the administrative proceedings . . • that the 
respondent's advertisement are false or misleading .... " 391 F. Supp. at 704. He 
then concluded that the equities also weighed against injunctive relief since there 
was no evidence that the weight treatment harmed the public and an injunction would 
likely harm the operators and patrons of the program. 391 F. Supp. at 707. 
Some three months after that decision, the administrative law judge hearing the 
case against Simeon Management granted a modified version of the cease and desist 
order requested by the Commission. See Simeon Management Corp., FTC Docket 
No. 8996 (June 18, 1975), summarized 3 TRADE REG. REP. CCH ,i 20,930. Subse-
quently the Commission petitioned Judge Orrick for an injunction pending its appeal 
of his earlier decision, but that request was denied. 
64. 532 F.2d at 713. In arguing that a more lenient standard governed issuance 
of jnjunctions under section 13 (a), the Commission relied on the Seventh Circuit's 
decision in National Commn. on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975), which 
was issued subsequent to the district court's action in Simeon. 
65. The Ninth Circuit noted that, by concluding that section 13(a) required the 
courts to exercise "independent judgment" as to the propriety of an injunction, it 
had avoided the constitutional problems that would be raised by the adoption of 
a "reason to believe" standard. 532 F.2d at 713. The court suggested that recent 
decisions of the Supreme Court had indicated that commercial speech was not im• 
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Report's express statement that section 13 (b) was an intended 
codification of the decisions in National Health Aids and Sterling 
Drug, Congress considered the courts' function under either section to 
be the exercise of "independent judgment" on the appropriateness 
mune from the protections of the first amendment, and that procedural safeguards 
were vitally important where potentially protected speech was subjected to prior re-
straint. The court suggested that adequate safeguards would be lacking if courts 
were required to enjoin an advertisement simply because the "FTC claimed it was 
false." 532 F.2d at 713. While the court's concern that there be safeguards in the 
operation of section 13(a) is clearly legitimate, its presentation of the constitutional 
problem is somewhat distorted. Neither Rhodes nor National Commn. on Egg Nutri-
tion suggested that a "reason to believe" standard enabled the Commission to have 
an advertisement enjoined solely on the basis of its "claim" that the advertisement 
was false. The message of those cases was instead that courts should apply a stand-
ard of reasonableness in proceedings under section 13(a) rather than ihe traditionally 
higher standards required by equity. Moreover, one of the cases cited by the Ninth 
Circuit as representing the constitutionally required independent judgment was 
Sterling Drug, in which the Second Circuit expressly confined itself to a determina-
tion of whether there was "reason to believe" the advertisements in question were 
false. See text at note 36 supra. Thus it is far from clear that a "reason to believe" 
standard is inconsistent with the safeguards the Ninth Circuit deemed constitutionally 
required for section 13(a). 
This is not, however, to suggest that the problem raised is frivolous. Other courts 
have expressed similar concern. See note 59 supra. The Supreme Court has noted 
that "any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a 
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity." Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sulli-
van, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (emphasis original). In Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965), the Court suggested that the crucial requirement in a valid 
system of prior restraint was prompt judicial determination as to whether the ex-
pression restrained was within the protection of the first amendment. That require-
ment was examined in Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971), where one of the issues 
was the constitutionality of a statute authorizing the postmaster general to obtain 
a court order permitting the detention of an individual's in-coming mail upon a show-
ing of "probable cause to believe" that the individual was using the mails in the 
sale of obscene materials. The Court overturned the statute, holding that a judicial 
determination as to "probable cause," rather than as to the question of obscenity 
itself, was an insufficient basis upon which to abrogate the first amendment protec-
tion of the use of the mails. 400 U.S. at 420. Assuming both that "reason to 
believe" does not differ significantly from "probable cause to believe," and that 
Blount continues to be valid, the question of whether operation of section 13(a) 
on a "reason to believe" standard is constitutionally permissible would seem to hinge 
on the extent to which the first amendment protects advertising. As noted by the 
Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court has recently emphasized that commercial speech 
is not outside the protection of the first amendment. Yet the Court has also suggested 
that commercial speech may not be afforded all the protections awarded to other 
forms of expression. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 96 S. Ct. 1817, 1830 n.24 (1976), Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
majority, stated: 
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection, we 
have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. . . . 
rr:Jhe greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech . . . may make 
it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements for fear of silencing the 
speaker. . . . They may also make inapplicable the prohibition against prior 
restraints. (citations omitted) 
While Justice Blackrnun's rather tentative statement does not resolve the question 
raised by the Ninth Circuit, it would seem that any conclusion as to the unconstitu-
tionality of the Rhodes interpretation of section 13(a) is somewhat premature. 
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of an injunction. 66 On that basis, the court affirmed the denial of 
an injunction. 67 
As the more recent cases indicate, the present conflict revolves 
around the meaning of two congressional actions-the enactment of 
section 13 (a) in 1938 and the adoption of section 13 (b) thirty-five 
years later. Those cases have not, however, examined the legislative 
intent behind the former enactment but have instead concentrated 
upon the Conference Report accompanying the adoption of section 
13 (b) . That focus is misplaced, for Congress' action in 1973 was 
not only three and a half decades after the passage of the first pro-
vision 68 but was also decidedly ambiguous. While there is language 
in the Conference Report that purports to interpret cases involving 
section 13 (a), the essential purpose of that language is to illustrate 
the standards intended to govern section 13 (b) . Compounding the 
difficulty is the fact that the two cases cited by the Report, National 
Heal.th Aids and Sterling Drug, stand for somewhat different proposi-
tions. 69 Further, although Congress admittedly did not consider 
the standards for section 13 (b) to be "totally new" as opposed to 
those for section 13 (a), it does not follow that the standards were 
intended to be identical. Had that been its purpose, Congress' re-
fusal to simultaneously amend or abolish section 13 (a) would have 
been irrational. Section 13 (b) authorizes the Commission to seek 
preliminary relief against alleged violations of any law it enforces, 
including the section 12 violations to which section 13(a) is limited.70 
If the standards for each subsection were to be interpreted as identical, 
section 13 (a) would become entirely redundant, giving the Commis-
sion no authority it would not otherwise possess under 13 (b). Since 
66. The court acknowledged that the Conference Report represented a retrospec-
tive interpretation of section 13(a), but, citing FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 
U.S. 84 (1958), and NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974), the court 
held that the interpretation of a statute by the drafters of subsequent legislation is 
entitled to "significant weight." 532 F.2d at 713. The court's use of these cases 
to defeat the Commission's interpretation of section 13(a), however, is somewhat 
disingenuous, since the major point in each decision was the weight to be given 
a longstanding interpretation of a statute by the agency authorized to administer 
it. As the Supreme Court stated in Bell: 
(A] court may accord great weight to the longstanding interpretation placed 
on a statute by an agency charged with its administration. This is especially 
so where Congress has re-enacted the statute without pertinent change. In these 
circumstances, congressional failure to revise or repeal the agency's interpreta-
tion is persuasive evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Con-
gress. 
416 U.S. at 274-75. Those comments seem particularly appropriate in light of Con-
gress' failure to "revise or repeal" the Commission's interpretation of section 13(a) 
in 1973. 
67. 532 F.2d at 717. 
68. See note 66 supra. 
69. See text at notes 31, 36 supra. 
70. Federal Trade Commission Act, §§ 13(a), (b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(a) (1970), 
53(b) (Supp. V 1975). 
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Congress was clearly aware of section 13 (a) and the textual differ-
ence between it and 13 (b), 71 it seems difficult to conclude that identity 
of standards was its purpose. Moreover, the fact that section 12 
violations, in contrast to violations of other laws enforced by the 
Commission, may involve physical as well as financial injuries, 72 
lends credence to a conclusion that Congress intended a less vigorous 
standard to control issuance of an injunction in that context. 73 Thus, 
the enactment of section 13 (b) would seem to have raised rather 
than resolved questions with respect to 13(a). 
The courts' failure to examine the legislation that produced sec-
tion 13 (a) is unfortunate.74 Although the elements that comprise 
a "proper showing" are not expressly defined in the statute or its 
legislative history, the context in which the section developed makes 
Congress' intent reasonably apparent. 
Section 13(a) was but one aspect of the Wheeler-Lea Act's75 
general redefinition of the FTC's role in the regulation of food and 
drug advertising,76 and grew out of a prolonged congressional debate 
as to whether responsibility for that regulation was to be in the 
Commission or in the Food and Drug Administration. Although 
prior to 1938 neither agency had possessed express statutory au-
thority to regulate such advertising,77 the Federal Trade Commission 
had assumed jurisdiction on the basis of court decisions. 78 The 
Commission's detractors contended that it was ill-equipped to handle 
this responsibility. They asserted specifically that its enforcement 
powers and procedures were unrelated to the protection of consumer 
interests, 79 particularly since there were no direct penalties for viola-
11. See text at note 45 supra. 
12. See note 102 infra. 
73. That argument was raised by the Commission in Simeon, 532 F.2d at 713. 
74. The only cases that expressly considered the intentions of the drafters of 
the Wheeler-Lea Act were Rhodes and National Health Aids. The Seventh Circuit 
in Rhodes stated that there was no indication in section 13(a) or in its legislative 
history of what was intended by the "proper showing" requirement. 191 F.2d at 
747. Judge Chesnut in National Health Aids noted only that the phrase was unde-
fined in the statute. 108 F. Supp. at 346. 
75. 52 Stat. 116 (1938), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-55 (1970), as amended, 
(Supp. V 1975). See generally Lindahl, The Federal Trade Commission Act As 
Amended In 1938, 41 J. POLITICAL EcoN. 497 (1939). 
76. See text at note 99 infra. 
77. The FDA's jurisdiction was established by the legislation that created it, the 
Federal Food and Drugs Act, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), and the agency's authority to 
act was limited to interstate commerce in misbranded or adulterated foods and drugs. 
See Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drug Act: A Legal Critique, 1 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROB. 74 (1933 ). 
78. The Commission's jurisdiction at the time was limited to "unfair methods 
of competition," but courts had held the false advertising of any commodity to be 
within the scope of that phrase. See, e.g., FTC v. Winsted Hosiery, 258 U.S. 483 
(1922); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. FTC, 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919). 
19. See, e.g., 83 CONG. R.Ec. 394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Mapes). There was 
substantial dispute at the time concerning the extent of the Commission's responsibili-
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tions of the FTC Act. 80 Because offenders could only be ordered 
to cease and desist, it was contended that they had insufficient in-
centive to comply with the law81-a problem that was believed to 
be aggravated by the delays necessary to obtain and enforce such 
orders.82 
Legislation to correct these alleged deficiencies was proposed 
as part of a general revision of the existing Food and Drug Act,83 
and would have placed primary responsibility for regulating food and 
drug advertising in the FDA. 84 Among other things, the bill would 
ties to the consumer. Although the Commission had since its inception devoted 
substantial energies to the eradication of fraudulent advertising, see Posner, supra 
note 9, at 11, the Supreme Court in FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), 
held that the Commission's mandate to prevent "unfair methods of competition" lim-
ited the agency's jurisdiction to practices that, regardless of their impact upon the 
public, were harmful to competitors. Thus the Court overturned a cease and desist 
order against drug advertisements that were conceded to be "dangerously misleading" 
because there was no evidence that Raladam's competitor's had been harmed. See 
Lindahl, supra note 75, at 503. 
Despite that holding, the Commission had generally been able to establish its 
jurisdiction in consumer fraud cases. As the chairman of the Commission, Erwin 
Davis noted: "[I]t is the rarest case in the world, if it ever exists, where the con-
suming public is adversely affected by false or misleading advertisements that a com-
petitor is not also affected, and consequently we would 'have the requisite showing 
of competition." Bus. WEEK, Feb. 13, 1937, at 32. 
80. Civil penalties for violations of Commission cease and desist orders were 
first established by the Wheeler-Lea Act. See text at note 96 infra. Prior to that 
legislation, the Commission had been required to petition the courts for enforcement 
of an order, with the contempt power of the court thereafter being the sanction 
behind the cease and desist order. See Handler, The Control of False Advertising 
Under the Wheeler-Lea Act, 6 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 91, 104 n.74 (1939). Since 
it had been held that the Commission could petition for enforcement of an order 
only upon evidence that the order was being violated, a respondent might actually 
have to repeat an offense three times before he could be punished: once to justify 
issuance of a cease and desist order, a second time to support a petition for enforce-
ment of the order, and a third time to justify imposition of penalties for violation 
of the court's decree. See [1928] FTC ANN. REP. 78. 
81. See, e.g., Senate Hearings on S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 360 (1935) (statement 
of W.G. Campbell, then Chief of the FDA); 83 CONG. R.Ec. 3287 (1938) (remarks 
of Sen. Copeland). 
82. Since full administrative hearings were required before an order could be en-
tered and the Commission was thereafter required to follow a multi-step enforcement 
procedure, see note 80 supra, it was alleged that a deceptive advertiser had ample 
opportunity to reap the fruits of his crime and to embark upon a new line of decep-
tion before the Commission could lawfully restrain him. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REC, 
394 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Kenney). 
83. That legislation was the first of the so-called Copeland bills, named for Sen-
ator Royal S. Copeland of New York. The first bill was designated S.1944, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). In the six years in which Congress considered the Cope-
land legislation, 1933-38, four major revisions followed S.1944: S.2000, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. (1934); S.2800, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1935), and S.5, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). A detailed study of the progress 
of those bills through Congress and the political battles that ensued may be found 
in Cavers, The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legislative History and 
Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 2 (1939). 
84. See Fisher, The Proposed Food and Drugs Act: A Legal Critique, 1 LAW 
& CoNTEMP. PROB. 74 (1933). 
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have established civil and criminal penalties for false advertising 
to be enforced by the FDA. 85 Subsequent versions of the bill would 
have supplemented these powers by enabling the agency to seize 
drugs that were "dangerous to health under the conditions of use 
prescribed in the labeling or advertising thereof,"86 in some cases 
without prior judicial determination of the validity of the charge. 87 
Strong opposition to the increased powers contained in the legis-
lation prevented passage for several sessions of Congress and forced 
a number of revisions. 88 Much of the dispute focused on the pro-
visions relating to advertising, and reflected disagreement over whether 
the FTC or the FDA was the appropriate regulatory agency. Some 
congressmen considered the Commission's remedial (as opposed to 
preventive) procedure the appropriate way to mark the often hazy 
line between salesmen's "puffing" and actionable deception. 89 Addi-
tionally, while they recognized that the Commission's procedure was 
slow, they also felt it was more consistent with notions of fairness90 
and better calculated to ensure that regulation reflected the needs of 
industry as well as those of consumers. 91 The FDA, on the other 
hand, had gained a reputation among some congressmen as being 
arbitrary in its treatment of commercial interests. 92 
85. Id. To give force to its prohibition of false advertising, the bill declared 
an advertisement to be false if it were untrue in any particular, if it were mis-
leading, if it were contrary to the general agreement of medical opinion or if it 
represented directly or by inference or ambiguity that its product had any therapeutic 
effect in the treatment of any one of 36 enumerated diseases. The list ranged from 
carbuncles to sexual impotence, and the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized 
to add to it as he deemed appropriate. Id. 
86. S.S, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935). 
87. The FDA possessed authority under the 1906 Act to seize misbranded or 
adulterated foods or drugs in interstate ·commerce pursuant to court process. See 
Lee, The Enforcement Provisions of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 LAw & 
CoNTEMP. PROB. 71 (1939). S.1944, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933), would have ex-
tended those powers to cover cosmetic and health devices, and would have authorized 
"executive" seizures on probable cause where the product was so adulterated as to 
be "dangerous to health." See Fisher, supra note 84, at 111-12. S.5, 7th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1935), would have extended those powers to advertising by defining as 
adulterated a drug that was dangerous by reason of its advertising. See Cavers, 
supra note 83, at 39. The "executive" seizure provisions were eventually discarded 
in a revision of S.5 (1935). Subsequent versions of the bill would have authorized 
the FDA to seize products, but only pursuant to court process. 
88. See note 83 supra. 
89. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 4-6 (1937). 
90. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 398-99 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece). 
91. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 401 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Halleck). The con-
cern that legitimate commercial activity not be harassed was consistently expressed 
in the congressional debate over the regulation of food and drug advertising. Much 
of the opposition to the broad criminal penalties contained in the Copeland legisla-
tion reflected visions of the "honest businessman" going to jail for some inadvertent 
commercial statement. 
92. See, e.g., 80 CONG. REc. 10679 (1936) (remarks of Rep. McCormick). The 
frequently expressed criticisms of the FDA reflected primarily a concern that no 
formal adversary procedure governed the agency's actions. See, e.g., 83 CONG. REc. 
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While debate over these proposals continued, 93 Senator Wheeler 
of Montana introduced legislation designed to remedy certain defects 
in the Federal Trade Commission Act. 94 A major objective of the 
bill was to streamline the cumbersome procedure by which the 
Commission enforced its orders. 95 It proposed automatic civil 
penalties for violations of "final" Commission orders, with finality 
based on either the respondent's failure to request judicial review 
or the completion of review by the courts.96 Additionally, the bill 
proposed that federal courts of appeals be authorized to enforce 
Commission orders pending resolution of an appeal. 97 
After passage by the Senate, 98 Representative Lea's House Inter-
state Commerce Committee added provisions expressly proclaiming 
the FTC's jurisdiction over food and drug advertising and expanding 
its related regulatory powers. 99 The concept was that of scaled 
enforcement: The remedial approach of the FTC's cease and desist 
procedure was to be retained, but the Commission would have addi-
410 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Lea); 83 CONG. REC. 411 (1938) (remarks of Rep. 
O'Malley). Suspicions concerning the FDA's methods were reinforced by the deci-
sion in Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936), in which the Supreme Court 
overturned regulations establishing price rates in the meat packing industry and at 
the same time criticized the procedures by which these rates were developed. 
93. In the course of the debate, a compromise was proposed that nearly resolved 
the dispute over the proper agency for the regulation of food and drug advertising. 
In May, 1935 the Senate passed S.5, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., which modified some 
of the provisions of the original bill. See note 83 supra, while still giving the FDA 
jurisdiction over food and drug advertising. See 19 CONG. REc. 8356 (1935). In 
June, 1936 the House adopted that bill, but only after amending it so that food 
and drug advertising would continue to be policed by the Commission's cease and 
desist procedure. See 80 CONG. REc. 10230-10244 (1936). The conferees appointed 
to resolve the dispute proposed a compromise that would have only given the FDA 
jurisdiction over food and drug advertising affecting health, leaving responsibility for 
all other violations to the Commission. See 80 CONG. REC. 10514-10520 (1936). 
It was thus contemplated that the stricter provisions of the Copeland bill would be 
limited in application to "advertising affecting the public health," 80 CONG. REC. 
10676 (1936) (remarks of Rep. Chapman), and that the Commission would regulate 
the commercial aspects of food and drug advertising through the cease and desist 
procedure. The compromise ultimately failed, however, as the House remained ada-
mant in its refusal to expand the FDA's jurisdiction to include advertising. See 
80 CoNG. REC. 10674-80. Although Congress eventually adopted the Copeland Food 
and Drug Act in June, 1938, 52 Stat. 1040, the law as enacted made no reference 
to food and drug advertising, and thus tacitly conceded that regulatory responsibility 
would remain with the Commission. 
94. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937). 
95. The other major objective of the bill was to reverse the effects of the Raladam 
decision, see note 79 supra, by expanding the Commission's jurisdiction to include 
"unfair or deceptive acts," thus eliminating the requirement that the Commission 
demonstrate injury to competition before it acts. See Lindahl, supra note 75, at 
502-03; note 79 supra. 
96. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1937). 
97. S.1077, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1937). 
98. S.1077 passed the Senate in March, 1937. See 81 CONG. REC. 2087 (1937). 
99. The text of S.1077 as modified by the Lea Amendments can be found at 
83 CONG, REc. 404 (1938). 
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tional power in certain enumerated situations. Accordingly, while 
section 12 declared all false advertisements of food or drugs to be 
illegal, it was proposed that any of three different responses might 
be appropriate depending on the facts of the particular case.100 
First, civil and criminal penalties would be established in section 
14 for violations that were either intentional or that involved products 
"injurious to health."101 Second, the Commission would be given 
authority in section 13 (a) to seek preliminary injunctions against 
advertisements alleged to be false when such relief would promote 
"the interest of the public."102 Finally, the existing cease and desist 
procedure, as modified by the proposals of Senator Wheeler, would 
be retained as the appropriate response to violations that were in-
100. 83 CoNG. REC. 404 (1938). See Note, The Consumer and Federal Regula-
tion of Advertising, 53 HARv. L. REV. 828, 838-39 (1940). Section 12 states: 
(a) it shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation to dis-
seminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false advertisement 
(1) By United States mails, or in commerce by any means, for the pur-
pose of inducing, or which is likely to induce, directly or indirectly, the pur-
chase of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics; or 
(2) By any means, for the purpose of inducing, or which is likely 
to induce, directly or indirectly the purchase in commerce of food, drugs, de-
vices, or cosmetics. 
(b) The dissemination or the causing to be disseminated of any false adver-
tisement within the provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall be an unfair 
or deceptive act or practice in commerce within the meaning of Section 5. 
83 CoNG. REc. 405 (1938). The identical provision was eventually enacted, see 
text at note 108 supra, and codified at 15 U.S.C. § 52 (Supp. V 1975), see note 
2.supra. 
101. See 83 CoNG. REc. 404 (1938). Although the FTC was not to be autho-
rized to prosecute section 14 offenses, it was intended that the Commission would 
conduct the basic investigation and then refer the matter to the Justice Department 
for further proceedings. See 83 CONG. REC. 398 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece). 
102. See 83 CoNG. REc. 404 (1938). As initially conceived, section 13(a) would 
only have applied to advertisements involving products "imminently dangerous to 
health." See To Amend the Federal Trade Commission Act, Hearings on H.R. 3143 
Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
59 (1937). During the 1930s, great notoriety attached to a number of cases in 
which medicinal products widely distributed to the public had proved to be dangerous. 
One such incident occurred during congressional debate over the food and drug legis-
lation, with at least 73 persons dying from a drug called "Elixir Sulfanihide." Sec-
tion 13(a) was clearly a response to precisely such products that were "imminently 
dangerous to health." Although the reasons for the statute's change to a "public 
interest" standard are not entirely clear, it was certainly widely assumed that the 
Commission's utilization of section 13(a) was to be limited to "emergency" situa-
tions, 83 CONG. REC. 399 (1938), where death, 83 CONG. REc. 3290 (1938), or 
at least injury, 83 CONG. REc. 392 (1938), were threatened. The Commission's 
early use of the remedy would also suggest that understanding of its purpose. Thirty-
three of the first 35 actions brought under section 13(a) involved advertisements 
of products that were "of a dangerous nature and injurious to health." [1941) FTC 
ANN. REP. 102. The other two actions involved "irreparable, pecuniary injury" to 
the public and were directed at a multi-state scheme for the sale of cosmetics, in 
which consumers were induced to purchase overpriced cosmetics as part of a contest 
for a new car and cash prizes. [1940) FTC ANN. REP. 99-100. See FTC v. Thom-
son-King & Co., 30 F.T.C. 1692 (N.D. Ill.), motion for supersedeas denied, 109 
F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1940); FTC v. Winship Corp., 30 F.T.C. 1697 (S.D. Iowa 1940). 
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advertent and did not threaten material injury to the public.103 
Opposition developed to the Lea amendments based principally 
on the argument that the public needed greater protection from all 
forms of false food and drug advertising rather than from merely 
the more threatening cases.104 A proposed amendment would have 
established minimum civil penalties for all violations of section 12, 
regardless of their impact upon the consumer.105 There was also 
interest in a proposal to require the Commission to seek a preliminary 
injunction for all violations of section 12.100 Neither addition, how-
ever, was thought to be sufficiently considerate of the needs of busi-
ness, 107 and the structure devised by the Lea amendments went into 
the law intact upon passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act in 1938.108 
In drafting section 13 (a), Congress isolated two basic issues as 
relevant to the propriety of an injunction: whether the advertisement 
was false100 and whether premilinary relief would be in the public 
interest.110 With respect to the first issue, courts have divided over 
whether the Commission need only demonstrate "reason to believe" 
an advertisement false111 or whether the Commission must make a 
greater showing, such as the "probability of ultimate success" re-
quired by the Ninth Circuit in Simeon.112 
103. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1937); 83 CoNo. REC. 
398 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece); Lindahl, supra note 75, at 512. 
104. See 83 CoNo. REC. 406 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Kenney). At the core 
of the argument was the conviction that the cease and desist procedure could not 
supply the necessary protection. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 
23-26 (1937). 
105. For the text of the proposed amendment, see 83 CoNo. REC. 405 (1938). 
106. See H.R. REP. No. 1613, 15th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1937). 
107. The sponsors of the Lea Amendments were persuaded that all of the various 
types of section 12 offenses "could not justly be placed in one common mold for 
the purpose of penalization." Id. at 6. They were thus convinced that application 
of the harsher remedies provided in section 13(a) and section 14 required considera-
tion of the nature of the particular offense lest the ordinary businessman find himself 
dragged into court for some trivial or inadvertent offense. See note 91 supra. In 
response to the proposal that penalties be established for all violations of section 
12, Rep. Lea stated: 
This is not the practical way to deal with businessmen. This is going to destroy 
the principal virtue of the Federal Trade Commission procedure, which is to 
give the honest businessman a chance to adjust his differences without harassing 
or bringing him into court . . . . We are in a time when Congress should at 
least be fair to the business of this country, and we cannot proceed on the 
theory that every businessman is in a conspiracy to violate the law or racketeer. 
83 CONG. REc. 406 (1938). 
108. The House adopted the bill in January 1938. See 83 CoNo. REc. 424 
(1938). It was approved by the Senate in March of the same year. See 83 CoNo. 
REC, 8293 (1938). 
109. The specific requirement of section 13(a) is that there be evidence of an 
existing or imminent violation of section 12. See notes 5, 100 supra. 
110. See text at note 16 & note 5 supra. 
111. See text at note 25 supra. 
112. 532 F.2d at 714. 
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Before determining which of those standards Congress intended 
to invoke through section 13(a), it would be useful first to consider 
the extent· to which they are actually distinct. The Ninth Circuit in 
Simeon, consistent with the directive of the Conference Report, de-
fined the "probability of ultimate success" standard as requiring an 
"independent judgment" by the court on an advertisement's falsity.113 
Yet the Second Circuit in Sterling Drug had itself exercised such 
"independent judgment," a fact acknowledged by the Ninth Circuit 
in Simeon,114 in finding that the Commission had failed to establish 
"reason to believe" that the advertisements there involved were 
false.115 Nor did the Seventh Circuit's decision in Rhodes absolve 
the courts from responsibility for an independent determination on 
the "reason to believe" issue. Rather, it rejected reliance on the 
traditionally stricter standards applicable to private litigation.116 
Thus, it is not clear that requiring the Commission to demonstrate a 
probability of ultimate success, as that phrase has been applied in 
section 13 (a) proceedings, differs significantly from a requirement 
that it demonstrate "reason to believe" that a particular advertisement 
is false. Under either standard, the court's essential responsibility is 
the same: to render an independent judgment as to whether a section 
12 violation has occurred. 
In any event, an interpretatlon of the "probability of ultimate 
success" standard that places a significantly greater burden of per-
suasion upon the Commission than a "reason to believe" standard 
would appear contrary to the purposes of section 13 (a) . Congress 
intended section 13 (a) to provide an exception to the Commission's 
otherwise remedial powers by enabling it to suppress immediately 
a falsely advertised product that threatened the consuming public.117 
A requirement that the Commission go substantially beyond a "rea-
son to believe" showing before it could implement the injunction 
procedure is inconsistent with the procedure's prophylactic purpose. 
Moreover, the relationship section 13 (a) bears to the cease and 
desist procedure is further evidence that Congress intended a "reason 
to believe" standard. Since that procedure operates on the same 
standard118 and since the Commission is authorized by section 13(a) 
113. 532 F.2d at 713. See text at note 66 supra. 
114. 532 F.2d at 713. See text at note 66 supra. 
115. See text at note 36 supra. 
116. See text at notes 20, 22 supra. 
117. The procedure to be employed was described by Senator Wheeler as follows: 
A complaint is lodged with the Federal Trade Commission. . . . If the 
product is . . . one that might be injurious to the public, one which might cause 
death, the Commission can immediately get a temporary injunction in the Fed-
eral court until such time as they can make a thorough investigation. 
83 CONG. REc. 3290 (1938). 
118. § 5(b), 15 U.S.C. § 4S(b) (Supp. V 197S), directs the Commission to issue 
a complaint "[w]henever the Commission shall have reason to believe" that a viola-
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to seek an injunction pending its initiation of cease and desist pro-
ceedings, 119 it would be illogical to require the Commission to surpass 
a "reason to believe" standard in -order to obtain an injunction. 
With respect to the second issue presented by section 13 (a), 
whether an injunction is in the public interest, the cases have divided 
as to whether the court's independent consideration is required. The 
Seventh Circuit has held that the Commission's demonstration of 
"reason to believe" that an advertisement is false is sufficient in itself 
to meet the public interest test.120 The Ninth Circuit, however, has 
gone beyond the falsity question to weigh the harm threatened by 
the advertisement's continuation against the detrimental effects of 
a preliminary injunction.121 
The Seventh Circuit's position is based upon two separate argu-
ments already discussed briefly above: 122 first, that evidence of the 
public interest in an injunction is automatically apparent from evi-
dence that an advertisement misleads the public, and, second, that 
determination of the public interest is primarily within the discretion 
of the Commission. The first argument treats the two requirements 
of section 13 (a) as indistinguishable: The issue of whether an 
injunction would be in the public interest is thus transformed into a 
question of whether discontinuing false advertisements is in the public 
interest. Congress has presumably decided the latter question affir-
matively by adopting section 12, declaring false advertisement of food 
and drugs to be illegal. The section 13 (a) issue is different, how-
ever, for it involves not ultimate objectives but rather procedure-
a procedure that implicitly recognizes the balance between com-
mercial and consumer interests struck by Congress in adopting the 
Wheeler-Lea Act. By rejecting proposals to expand the remedies 
of that Act123 or to transfer responsibility to the FDA, 124 Congress 
retained· the cease and desist procedure as the principal regulatory 
mechanism in food and drug advertising. It thereby affirmed the 
advertiser's right to remain free of the law's restraint absent a full 
administrative and judicial determination that the challenged advertise-
ment was false. 125 At the same time, by adopting section 13(a), 
Congress mandated that the advertiser's procedural interest should 
give way in appropriate circumstances to the consuming public's need 
for protection from falsely advertised products. 
tion of the act has occurred and it "appear[s] to the Commission that a proceeding 
by it in respect thereof would be to the interest of the public." See text at note 10 
supra. 
119. See note 16 supra. 
120. See text at notes 25, 51 supra. 
121. 532 F.2d at 714-16. 
122. See text at notes 27, 28 supra. 
123. See text at note 105 supra. 
124. See text at notes 89-92 supra. 
125. See notes 80, 82 supra. 
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In section 13 (a) as originally formulated, those circumstances 
were specifically identified since the procedure was limited to adver-
tisement of products "imminently dangerous to health."126 The public 
interest requirement of the enacted statute serves a similar identifying 
function, but, rather than limiting the remedy to specific enumerated 
circumstances, it juxtaposes an injunction, and its consequent abro-
gation of procedural rights, with protection of the public and in that 
way allows a weighing of the respective interests of advertiser and 
consumer. Although evaluation of those interests is necessarily 
dependent upon the particular circumstances of a given case, evidence 
only that an advertisement is misleading is insufficient to establish 
that an injunction is in the public interest. This result gives proper 
value to Congress' commitment to the cease and desist procedure as 
the principal method of prosecuting section 12 violations. 
The second of the Seventh Circuit's arguments suggested that 
whether an injunction was in the public interest was a j~dgment that 
should be left to the Commission's discretion. That interpretation 
of section 13 (a) effectively equates the standards for issuance of an 
injunction with those governing the initiation of cease and desist 
proceedings, since the prerequisites to a complaint are that the Com-
mission have "reason to believe" that a violation of the FTC Act has 
occurred and that it "appear" to the Commission that cease and 
desist proceedings would be in the public interest.127 The equation 
is ill-conceived. First, and perhaps most obviously, the "public in-
terest" requirement under section 13 (a) is concerned not with what 
"appears" to the Commission but rather with whether the Commis-
sion has "reason to believe." More fundamentally, the questions refer 
to different procedures. The Commission's issuance of a complaint is 
merely a first step in its process of enforcement. A complaint places 
the respondent under no restraint since there must be administrative 
proceedings, followed by an opportunity for judicial review, before 
a cease and desist order can take effect. A preliminary injunction 
is drastically different since it places substantially the same restraint 
upon the respondent as would a final cease and desist order, but can 
be issued prior to any administrative proceedings. Thus, equating 
the standards for issuance of an injunction and issuance of a complaint 
gives the Commission uninhibited authority to decide whether an 
advertisement will be restrained prior to, or only at the conclusion 
of, the cease and desist procedure. 
Whatever the merits of placing such authority in the Commission, 
126. See note 102 supra. 
127. See note 118 supra. That the Seventh Circuit intended to suggest the equa-
tion is indicated more forcefully by the fact that the court, in referring to the Com-
mission's "broad discretion," cited FTC v. Klesner, discussed at note 10 supra, in 
which the Supreme Court defined the nature of the "public interest" necessary to 
support issuance of a complaint. 
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Congress clearly did not intend that result when it adopted the 
Wheeler-Lea Act. Congress rejected FDA regulation of food and 
drug advertising largely because it feared giving too much discretion-
ary power to an administrative agency.128 The Commission was 
considered procedurally fairer because of its adversarial administra-
tive hearings and also because enforcement of its orders was postponed 
until completion of judicial review.120 Having those perceptions, 
Congress would have been unlikely to delegate to the Commission 
authority to dispense with those procedures and preliminarily restrain 
an advertiser. That conclusion is buttressed by an examination of 
the ordering of judicial and administrative responsibilities established 
by the Wheeler-Lea Act. Although those portions of the Act not 
confined to food and drug advertising effected certain changes in 
the Commission's jurisdiction and procedure, the basic structure es-
tablished by the original FfC Act was retained. 130 Development 
of cease and desist orders remained a function of the Commission's 
administrative procedure, with actual enforcement awaiting comple-
tion of judicial review.131 The one newly created exception em-
powered a federal court of appeals to enforce preliminarily a Commis-
sion order pending resolution of an appeal, 132 but the court was 
directed to take that action only when "necessary in its judgment 
to prevent injury to the public or to competitors."'133 In sum, the Act 
provided that Commission orders, themselves the product of full 
administrative hearings, would take effect prior to judicial review 
only to the extent necessary, in the judgment of the court, to prevent 
injury to the public or competitors. 
Although section 12 offenses present a stronger case for pre-
liminary enforcement, 134 it is likely, given congressional concern that 
there be judicial supervision of the Commission's process of enforce-
ment and that the procedural rights of the respondent be considered, 130 
that Congress intended the courts to consider whether the public inter-
est required that an advertisement be preliminarily restrained under 
13(a). Indeed, the legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea Act leaves 
little doubt that courts should form an independent judgment "that 
128. See note 92 supra and accompanying text. 
129. See text at note 90 supra. 
130. See text a£ note 95 supra. 
131. See text at note 96 supra. 
132. See text at note 97 supra. 
133. § 5(c), 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (1970). 
134. Of course section 13(a) is limited to violations of section 12, unlike the 
provisions of section 5(c), which would apply to any cease and desist order issued 
by the Commission. Violations of section 12 are distinguished from violations of 
other laws the Commission polices by the fact that they may cause physical as well 
as pecuniary injuries. See note 102 supra. 
135. See text at note 129 supra. 
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issuance of an injunction is necessary and justified in the public 
interest."136 
This interpretation is consistent with Congress' intent that appli-
cation of section 13 (a) reflect the interests of the public as well 
as the businessman. Since section 13 (a) was designed to provide 
the Commission with an immediate remedy, it is evident, as was 
concluded in Rhodes, that the statute operates on a "reason to be-
lieve" standard, with the Commission not being required to prove its 
allegations conclusively but simply being obliged to establish them as 
reasonably based in fact. That standard does not deprive the courts 
of an independent role; rather it admonishes that section 13 (a) in-
junctions are for the protection of the public and that doubts should 
be resolved in favor of the public. Contrary, however, to the Rhodes 
decision, Congress did not intend the Court's inquiry to be limited to 
the question of an advertisement's falsity. Implicit within the re-
quirement that an injunction be in the public interest are the equitable 
considerations that courts have traditionally weighed in determining 
the appropriateness of preliminary relief. Thus, as was done in Na-
tional Health Aids and Simeon, courts should balance the harm 
threatened to the public by continuation of an advertisement against 
the injury threatened to the advertiser by preliminary termination. 
This balancing need only establish "reason to believe" that an injunc-
tion is in the public interest, and thus protection of the public should 
be paramount in the evaluation. 
136. See 83 CoNG. REc. 398-99 (1938) (remarks of Rep. Reece). Although 
Representative Reece's comments are by far the most explicit expression of the in-
tended role of the courts in the operation of section 13(a), they reflected the con-
cerns expressed by others in Congress that procedural rights be observed. As Rep-
resentative Reece stated: 
The procedure which your committee has devised provides for due process 
of law, and at the same time, through the injunction process, makes it possible 
for the Commission to move with sufficient promptness to meet any emergency 
situation that may arise. Under this procedure, necessary and constitutional 
safeguards of property rights will be afforded. Before an injunction can issue, 
first the Commssion, itself a quasi judicial body of five members, must be con-
vinced that an emergency exists, and it in turn must convince the court of proper 
jurisdiction of the existence of such emergency, and that issuance of an injunc-
tion is justified and necessary in the public interest. 
83 CONG. REC. 398-99 (1938). . 
